In Tierra Del Fuego Customs Alerts Are Only Registered In the Agents’ E-Mail
<p style="line-height: 20.8px;"><span style="line-height: 1.6em;">Employees shall "periodically review" their emails and the warnings and the actions taken then are not reflected in any document. Controls on ships and trucks are selective, though without specific criteria. Most of the scales are expired, missing dogs and there are cameras down and misplaced.</span></p> <div> </div>
After analyzing the operation of the two Customs of Tierra del Fuego, the General Audit Office (AGN, for its acronym in Spanish) found that "General Control Alerts are received via email and depend on the agents periodically reviewing (their e-mail) for the purpose of taking special precautions."
The finding becomes relevant if one considers that these mails are not to be received daily in any office, birthday reminders of colleagues: it is notices issued by the General Department of Customs Control serving to focus control tasks to operations that pose a high risk.
But that's not all: the auditors also stressed that both the dependence of Ushuaia and Rio Grande "have not been informed of the use of a register of received control alerts and related actions", which It means, in short, that the inboxes of the agents end up being the only file those warnings and the measures taken accordingly.
Something similar happens with other warnings, "Control Alerts for specific operations" in the south are also received via email and "shall not establish a lock on the Maria Information System (SIM)," the AGN says, when referring to the specific software used in the country's customs.
Ships and Trucks
The audit report was approved this year on 2012 data and includes a section dedicated to the controls carried out (or should perform) to transportation such as ships and trucks, and the instruments used for these tasks.
As for the ships, research explains that the specific control is the "anchor", used to search hidden, prohibited or illegal goods and also includes the review of documents to be carried on board.
However, technicians "did not obtain evidence on the criteria to be considered for selection Customs control method to be applied." In fact, "in the Rio Grande division, as there is a deep-water port, there is no background checks related to funding. While in the Ushuaia division no moorings are performed on ships but determined, based on certain parameters, (they are) more risky," adds the report.
So expressed, it seems that these audits became subject to hunches and intuitions of the agents. And a similar picture is to be warned about the use of scanners in the southern Customs: according to the AGN, "the selection applied to control goods is not determined by a computer system, it was not reported on guidelines applied to select the loads to be scanned, nor is there any backup policy of the images captured by the scanners."
The scanner as a tool of control is a recurring theme in the audit reports dedicated to Customs.
Specifically in the dependence of Ushuaia it was observed that there were "no scanners for checking trucks with container cargo, and the one used at the airport (in the city) for checking baggage and goods had frequent failures due to its use. ”Because the device dates back to 2001, so the AGN attribution was made, this was a request for its replacement."
The office of Rio Grande, meanwhile, "did not provide a background to the operation of the scanner used in San Sebastian for differentiating organic and inorganic substances," and to complete: "there are no standard procedures to apply in case adverse weather does not allow the use of the scanner."
And when it comes to tools, the report argues that at the time of the review, the 17 scales in Ushuaia’s customs had expired certificates enabling regulation –that is issued- by the National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI, for its acronym in Spanish).
Meanwhile in Rio Grande, 19 of the 20 scales had an expired permit. In both cases it was observed that these devices "did not issue tickets."
Another recurring theme in this research is the dogs serving in customs. The AGN says that Ushuaia reported that "no dogs are used in the control of import operations" and that the division of Rio Grande "has only one dog for use in operational control of goods, and luggage upon arrival of commercial passenger flights to regulate the city airport and San Sebastian.”
And, with regard to CCTV, technicians stressed that "no evidence of the existence of review procedures for the captured images are obtained." In this regard, the Federal Watchdog said that after their field work, the Directorate General of Customs, which is under the aegis of the Federal Public Revenue Administration (AFIP, for its acronym in Spanish), "issued a general policy statement on backing up the images obtained."
"During its visit to Ushuaian Customs, the auditors verified that the system used to store images allowed for 45 days and then recorded over automatically, without carrying out any back up.” Moreover, the existence of two chambers of the firm Multistore SA, one located on the campus of controls on which the image did not cover the entire space was observed. And the second chamber, located in the bonded warehouse of the firm DEFASA SA, which was not operational," completed the investigation.
To complete the issue of working tools, technicians reported that none of the areas used seals where they control and store goods.
In that sense, the report explains that "the safekeeping of the goods is the responsibility of Customs, from storing up to final disposal." However, in the dependence of Ushuaia "containers with pending goods were stored with the rest, without discernment and, for knowing the correct location (of each good), officers should consult with the permit company."
Meanwhile, in Rio Grande using an application called ALOT, which is compulsory for all those admitted to deposit goods from seizures. This program is complementary to the manual records that make up the inventory. However, "the audit team has found in its survey that a lot of LED TVs located in the corresponding deposit, not on the inventory provided by the company," referring to the customs unit itself.
As a backdrop to all these comments, the General Audit Office revealed that "in two offices they did not have standardized procedures manuals for the execution of their duties." And besides, "it evidenced the existence of activities for which a specific regulatory framework was not taken, leaving their development to the discretion of the acting official."