In 2010, the Social Work Income Program (PRIST, for its acronym in Spanish) received almost $ 2,711 million to operate. But the General Audit Office (AGN, for its acronym in Spanish) warned of problems in accountability, lack of criteria in the selection of beneficiaries, lack of databases and evaluation systems, which leads to the conclusion that "effective, efficient, Equitable and economic development of public funds was affected. "

The objective of PRIST is "to achieve the promotion of economic development through social inclusion by generating genuine jobs that, in turn, the formation of social organizations of work."

It is implemented from subsidies to local governments and cooperatives. It depends organically of the Ministry of Social Development "to take charge of the execution of the same was established Unit Executing Social Income with Labor (UEIST)," which acquired the rank of undersecretary but that, in fact, "only intervened in operational aspects And administrative "because those in charge of its execution was the Secretariat for Coordination and Institutional Monitoring (SCyMI).

One of the fundamental axes of the program is the training, both in trades and in the cooperative organization, the latter in charge of the National Institute of Associativism and Social Economy (INAES, for its acronym in Spanish). The themes "varied according to the needs and problems of each municipality". Although the interviews with the cooperative members revealed that the trainings were received, "there is no documentary support."

The agency adds that "there was an adequate registration, monitoring and control of the information provided in the formations." Neither was there a systematic plan or program of training nor was a system of evaluation, impacts and achievements created.

Taking into account that the program received almost $2,711 million, accountability becomes a fundamental item. In this regard, the AGN explains that the current resolution in this area defines the subsidy as "a one-time benefit to natural persons" and that, with exceptions, "should not exceed a percentage of the minimum wage, vital and mobile." It is clear that the funds that the Ministry "do not meet the particularities described in the regulations" and therefore "becomes inapplicable" for this program.

As for the agreements signed by the Social Development portfolio with the Executing Entities, which are those granting subsidies at the local level, "the direct responsibilities for surrender were not assigned." It adds that "the deadlines for submission are not met." Normally a maximum of 90 days is foreseen but, in fact, "there is no clarification on the matter in the contracts."

Who and Why?
The report, which was evaluated in 2010 and approved in February 2016, stresses that jobs should be distributed "taking into account labor and socio-economic vulnerability indicators, mainly unemployment and poverty". Based on these data, the Ministry of Development "projected the creation of 150 thousand jobs in Greater Buenos Aires and another 100 thousand in the interior of the country, with priority in NOA, NEA and Cuyo."

In this regard, the auditors point out that "the socio-occupational opportunities established in each municipality were not respected". It was verified "the creation of more jobs" in some localities, for example in San Vicente, Berisso, General Las Heras and José C. Paz. In the latter "the positive variation was 171%, which is equivalent to 6536 additional jobs."

On the other hand "there were municipalities where less than 50% of the projected ones were created" as in General San Martín, Merlo, Morón and Tigre. This situation "was not rectified nor was there any prospect of seeking correction."

The call that the program had was so multitudinous that "it took the help of universities for the loading process". In this regard, the AGN states that the agency "did not have a record of the total number of applicants or those who indicated their willingness to be included in the program."

On the other hand, operational "inconveniences" and "coordination" were also detected in the implementation of payments, social coverages and insurance by accident. "Problems were found for the adhesion to social works and obtaining credentials since there were no formalized agreements for the acceptance of these new self-employed workers."

As for the cooperatives, which had to be registered in the INAES, it was possible to observe "formal deficiencies in their constitution, operation and fulfillment of legal, statutory and tax obligations." Just to cite as an example, many had not filed sworn statements of VAT.