While the budget of the Highway Concession (OCCOVI, for its acronym in Spanish) increased by 7309% in three years, a study by the General Audit Office (AGN), in 2006, states that the controls to be performed by the entity to the roads are under its orbit are "insufficient in quantity and quality of information," adding: "It is noted that the OCCOVI does not measure the pavement condition with the minimum required frequency.”

Moreover, the Audit reviewed the work of the OCCOVI as executor of infrastructure, a power that was conferred by Decree 1,915 / 04. About the new powers of the organism, the AGN concluded that it could involve "dispute situations regarding responsibilities" because "to co-manage the exploitation of brokers with dealers, it loses the necessary impartiality that should govern their actions." Apart from that, the audit found "highly significant delays" in implementing the schedule of works that were in charge of the agency, involving the steps of programming, tendering, and execution of works. "Delays mean increased spending on maintenance," said the study.
 
The regulatory framework of highway concessions in force since 2003 establishes a system of "co-management" between private companies and the Federal Government that ends this year. Following this framework, the preservation and maintenance of roads was left in the hands of the concessionaires, while the State, through the OCCOVI, took charge of investments in infrastructure and parts.
 
When the concessions were awarded, the roads had sections that were classified according to their maintenance: the "A", required conservation tasks made by companies, and the more deteriorated, "B" demanded repairs funded by the State. According to the report of the AGN, Concessions Commission took five days, from the 1st to the 5th of September 2003, to reclassify these sections under economic, financial, and legal meetings which were called Technical Data Room.
 
In those meetings the length of the sections of "A" level, freeing dealerships invest in maintenance fell "significantly." In the corridor No. 3, for example, passing through the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Córdoba, and La Pampa, the sections "A" reached 37% of the total length at the time of calling for competition, but in award came to represent 19%, and the No. 5 along Santa Fe, Córdoba, Santiago del Estero, Tucumán, Salta, and Jujuy, it decreased from 77% to 26%. The Audit added that it could not determine the criteria for reclassification of sections, because roads that were too damaged were awarded as "A", while others, with superficial or in a "good or very good" state, became category "B".

Similarly, the OCCOVI had scheduled for 2003 parts on roads with good surface parameters, just for the purpose of the grant, works on paths that had "limits" of impairment at the time of classification. The AGN said in its report that failed to access technical documentation on the methodology and criteria used for the reclassification of the sections due to a "lack of cooperation" of OCCOVI. Moreover, in the Data Room level necessary requirement was lowered to address and resolve the longitudinal deformation of the road "at the expense of transit conditions", as was completed by the Federal Watchdog.
From the findings of the audit, it appears that the concessionaires also facilitate the work of OCCOVI, because the construction plans presented by the companies do not have the necessary details of the maintenance tasks to be performed, "making it difficult, if not impossible to monitor these obligations," said the report. In addition, the work was "insufficient" in relation to the degree of deterioration of the roads: "This shows a misunderstanding of the state and development (of roads) which are necessary for proper management of conservation," added the AGN. At the same time, the shortcomings of dealerships evidence that the OCCOVI did not set a clear basis to control their actions. The audit found that there is a "strong distortion" in the way firms allocate their budgets, noting that the Corridor 5, for instance, had a total cost of $ 94,374,010, of which it spent 63 percent on maintenance of "grass and weeds, cleaning, and groves", some $ 59,829,649, while the item "preservation of the asphalt" received only 9 percent, $ 9,578,610.