The death of Cristian Crespo, the 17 year old who last week fell along two other teenagers from the sixth floor of a housing complex of Villa Soldati in which a railing failed, unveiled a series of failures with a long history in the management of the Buenos Aires Province, ranging from violations of laws 15 years ago which declared the emergency in the area- building industry and court decisions ordering spare parts, to the under-execution of budget allocations precisely for works.

In this regard, public control also warned in recent years about the "risks to the security of residents" of the building built some 40 years ago in the southern area of the City Capital.

In fact, just a decade ago, the Buenos Aires General Audit (AGCBA, for its acronym in Spanish) approved a report which analyzed the management of the Municipal Housing Commission, the body that later became the now notorious Housing Institute of the City (IVC).

That work reproduced a diagnosis of the Faculty of Architecture of the University of Buenos Aires (UBA) which listed "serious pathologies" from the building complex.

And in 2009, another research emerged and the IVC in operation- where observations related to structural problems, impaired gas connections, water and sewers were repeated, and even the poor state of elevators and roofs in same housing complex in the southern are of Buenos Aires.

First Warning

In 2003, the Buenos Aires Control Agency faced the task of making a financial study and management in the then Municipal Commission of Housing. However, later that year, a law transformed the entity in the current IVC, so the Audit decided to focus their research to the description of a complete picture of the situation (assets, staff costs) would find, after transition, the brand new institution to carry forward the housing policy of the City.

The report approved in 2005, included conclusions no at all encouraging. The Audit analyzed the management of the former Commission and noted "various parameters that are below the expected results, as well as high operating costs, low productivity performance and professionalism in the organization.”

As an example of these "parameters", compared with similar entities in other jurisdictions, the AGCBA said the Commission held, between 1976 and 2003, "ranked 19th in housing construction and housing solutions, ranking in the same range as the provinces Formosa, Jujuy, Chubut and La Pampa ".

Also while during that time the average housing construction nationwide was 1,412 units per year, the performance of the Commission of the City was of 799.

The former City agency itself exceeded the national average: the number of employees. It is that the average was provided between 1976 and 2003, 285 agents and the Commission had 653 and remained in second place, and behind a comfortable lead in the table, which was Santiago del Estero with 933 workers.

It was also noted in the former Commission a greater proportion of administrative employees in relation to the technical and professional staff, compared with other entities. And regarding the management of the budget, "the incidence of operating costs reached 30% of total expenditures," said the report. In other words, every 100 pesos spent in the period in question, 30 were for the payment of salaries and other expenses. In this ranking, the agency ranked fifth nationally.

And What about Soldati?

While it worked, the Municipal Housing Commission carried out the rehabilitation and maintenance program for Joint Urban and Neighborhoods, an initiative designed to respond to the "high degree of deterioration in buildings and housing units of Illia and Soldatti complex, altering built habitat, threatening the security of its inhabitants."
 
However, despite this sort of statement on the intentions of the program, the The Audit noted the "lack of detailed planning in execution times and costs necessary to resolve the problems identified" in the southern complex that just They were declared by the Emergency Housing in Buenos Aires Legislature, through laws 623 and 625.

Overall, the AGCBA describes that "many of the pathological manifestations analyzed (in Illia and Soldati complex) have been the result of foresight and / or construction errors and also because of inadequate maintenance or inefficient or inappropriate use by the users." In that sense, that led to "repeated" state spending "many incorrect repairs were observed."

As already mentioned, to have a more specific analysis of the situation in the south, the then Commission signed an agreement with the Faculty of Architecture of the University of Buenos Aires that, after analyzing the complex, listed several "pathologies" considered "very serious" by professionals.

For example, tall buildings, scholars noted "crowning fissures both as outgoing side and bodies; stains and drippings; moisture loss sanitary facilities; release coating and armor in sight in structural elements; corrosion of timber and other metals; rupture and disintegration of the sealing material in the expansion joint between buildings; plasters and landslides. "

Furthermore, in the so called knots; "shedding of precast panels that line the ducts incinerators and the support structure at risk of imminent collapse" was seen. 

"On the floor they found cameras without lids and cables outdoors; and no railing on the first floor, "continued the study and added that this level was designed for businesses but" was never used for that purpose "and, at the time of the tour, was" inhabited by families who were living precariously."

And to complete the picture, there also appeared "causes of vandalism, abuse or misuse of facilities such as the chaotic intervention original buildings, but widely prevalent absence of maintenance."

Remember a few paragraphs ago that the mission statement of the program analyzed was reproduced? Well, after all, and like a tautology, the conclusion of that work in 2005 said Illia housing complexes and Soldati, had "high degree of deterioration of buildings and housing units built altering habitat putting at risk the safety of the buildings. "

Furthermore, it added that "the resources allocated do not appear to be in line with the identified deficiencies."

The IVC

Four years later, specifically in 2009, the city Watchdog approved another work in which the work of the Housing Institute of the City was analyzed.

This latest research, done on 2007 data, also listed several "pathologies" of the housing complex Soldati, like "the installation system and gas supply was not according to the regulations", and warned "losses in rods and the keys of the meters and illegal connections."

There were also problems in the system of water supply and sewerage network, which "required periodic maintenance carried out by a crew of the IVC, in if unable to do their job, they were replaced by a 'vactor' truck to uncover and unblock them, "stressed the watchdog.

Another situation that drew the attention of the auditors was building "preserved the original asphalt membrane" and not precisely a commitment to vintage fashion. It is that, according to the report: "The poor state (of that coverage) causes leakage of rainwater through the roof at the resort" and even bearing walls were cracked.

It recalled the work, by an intimation of 2006 Buenos Aires Defender village, they should fix the elevators of the towers but at the time of the tour, "was not any running."

On the side of the structural problems, in 2009 the City Watchdog said "the building exposed and corroded reinforcement is evident in various structural elements: body lifts, landslides on balconies, water tanks, ladders, beams, supports and lintels, etc."